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Challenging Abortion Informed Consent 
Regulations through the First Amendment: The 
Case for Protecting Physicians’ Speech 
Maia Dunlap† 
INTRODUCTION 
A woman finds out she is pregnant. She makes the choice to termi-
nate her pregnancy. Maybe she decides this instantly. Perhaps she 
reaches her decision through a series of conversations with her partner, 
her family, or her friends. Regardless, there is only one person she will 
need to have a conversation with before she can have an abortion: her 
physician. 
Right? Actually, wrong. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 the Supreme Court allowed states to add them-
selves to the mix. While affirming a woman’s right to have an abortion, 
the Casey Court also acknowledged states’ rights to regulate and ex-
press disapproval of the practice. In so doing, the Court opened the door 
for states to join the private conversation between a woman and her 
physician. In the years since Casey, states have increasingly used this 
door to regulate what a physician must do or say to a woman before she 
can give her “informed consent” to an abortion. 
Because of this, obtaining an abortion can be a dramatically differ-
ent experience depending on where you live.2 In some states, abortion 
is treated like any other medical procedure, can be completed in one 
day, and only requires the signing of a standard medical consent form.3 
In contrast, many others states require all women seeking abortions to 
 
 †  B.F.A. 2013, Fordham University; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law 
School. Many thanks to Professors Daniel Hemel and Geoffrey Stone for their insight and thought-
ful feedback, and to the past and present staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum. 
 1 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 2 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://ww 
w.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [https://perma.cc/ 
V9ED-QU3M]. 
 3 Audrey Carlsen, Ash Ngu & Sara Simon, What It Takes to Get an Abortion in the Most Restr- 
ictive U.S. State, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/20/us/ 
mississippi-abortion-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/WRA6-NHJ8]. 
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first receive an ultrasound,4 a medically unnecessary procedure for 
first-trimester abortions (which 89% of abortions are).5 Some states fur-
ther regulate how physicians must narrate these ultrasounds and how 
women must listen.6 Many states require mandatory pre-abortion coun-
seling and a waiting period between receiving counseling and obtaining 
the procedure.7 Women may also hear that personhood begins at con-
ception,8 and medically inaccurate claims that medical abortion can be 
reversed9 and increases risk of breast cancer,10 suicide,11 and future in-
fertility.12 
Claiming to balance the rights of women with those of the state, 
the Casey court created a new test, dubbed the undue burden standard. 
Under this test, regulations on abortion are permissible provided they 
do not impose an undue burden on a woman’s choice to have an abortion 
before the fetus reaches viability (i.e. is potentially able to live outside 
the woman’s body).13 Most subsequent challenges to state abortion reg-
ulations have thus claimed that the regulations at issue impose an un-
due burden on a woman’s right to choose.14 
However, the undue burden standard poses a low bar that most 
regulations clear. As an alternative, some challengers have brought 
their claims as violations of physicians’ free speech rights under the 
First Amendment. Courts review First Amendment challenges under 
standards ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, “de-
pending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes 
underlying it.”15 In the context of informed consent, First Amendment 
claims have been subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny that can 
invalidate regulations which would otherwise likely survive an undue 
burden challenge. 
 
 4 Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.o 
rg/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/XK9E-6KXS]. 
 5 Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttma 
cher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/QHU5-Z8NM]. 
 6 Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4. 
 7 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/arizona-doctors-must-say- 
that-abortions-with-drugs-may-be-reversed.html [https://perma.cc/WAJ3-6HCQ]. 
 10 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (defining viability as “potentially able to live outside 
the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”). 
 14 See Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by 
Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain In-
formation, 119 A.L.R. 5th 315 (originally published 2004). 
 15 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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The challengers in Casey brought precisely such a claim, arguing 
that the informed consent provisions at issue infringed physicians’ First 
Amendment rights. The Court dismissed this claim in an ambiguous 
three-sentence paragraph that left open the question of whether such 
challenges can be sustained in the abortion context.16 Whether the un-
due burden test is the exclusive way through which to assess the con-
stitutionality of informed consent measures remains a live issue. A cir-
cuit split has developed, with the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits 
disallowing separate First Amendment challenges to “truthful, nonmis-
leading, and relevant” informed consent disclosures while the Fourth 
Circuit permits them. This leads to a second open question: if Casey 
does not foreclose physicians’ First Amendment challenges to informed 
consent laws, what standard of review should apply? 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the Supreme 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence with particular emphasis on Casey. Part 
II analyzes the circuit split and the rationales of the Eighth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourth Circuits. Part III looks closely at the language and 
reasoning of Casey and argues that it supports the view that First 
Amendment challenges to informed consent measures—even those that 
are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—can exist independently of 
the undue burden standard. Part IV advocates for intermediate scru-
tiny as the appropriate standard of review for such challenges. 
I. ABORTION AT THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Pre-Casey 
A woman’s right to have an abortion has been constitutionally pro-
tected since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade17 in 1973. In Roe, 
a pregnant unmarried woman brought suit against Wade, a Texas dis-
trict attorney, challenging an article of the Texas Penal Code that lim-
ited abortions to those done for the purpose of saving the life of the 
mother.18 Roe raised the question: does the constitutional right to pri-
vacy encompass a woman’s decision to have an abortion?19 
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and struck down 
the Texas statute.20 However, while acknowledging that the right to 
personal privacy included a woman’s decision to have an abortion, the 
Court did not leave this right unqualified. Instead, it developed a three-
 
 16 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 17 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 18 Id. at 120. 
 19 Id. at 153. 
 20 Id. at 166. 
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part framework roughly aligned with the trimesters of pregnancy, al-
lowing for increased state interference and regulation as pregnancy pro-
gresses.21 The Court acknowledged states’ “important and legitimate 
interest in potential life,”22 but found this interest compelling only at 
the point of viability.23 The framework broke down as follows: 1) until 
approximately the end of the first trimester, states could not interfere 
with a woman’s right to have an abortion; 2) after the first trimester 
but before viability, states could regulate abortion only “in ways that 
are reasonably related to maternal health;”24 3) after viability, states 
could freely regulate abortion and even prohibit it, as long as exceptions 
existed for the health or life of the woman.25 
B. Casey and the Undue Burden Standard 
Roe’s trimester framework governed abortion regulations, albeit 
shakily,26 for nearly two decades. In 1992, however, the Court offered a 
new approach in Casey. In Casey, Planned Parenthood brought a suit 
against Robert Casey, the governor of Pennsylvania, challenging a 
Pennsylvania law that restricted abortion access by requiring: 1) writ-
ten informed consent from a woman seeking an abortion; 2) a twenty-
four-hour waiting period between providing a woman with the informed 
consent information and performing an abortion; 3) if the woman was a 
minor, the informed consent of at least one parent; and 4) if the woman 
was married, a statement indicating her husband had been notified of 
the pending abortion.27 The informed consent provisions required phy-
sicians to inform women of the nature of the procedure, the health risks 
of abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the 
“unborn child.”28 Women had to be informed of the availability of 
printed materials published by the state that described fetal develop-
ment and provided information about medical assistance for childbirth, 
 
 21 Id. at 164–65. 
 22 Id. at 163. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 164. The Court listed examples of “permissible state regulation in this area,” which 
included regulating qualifications of the performing physicians and facilities in which abortions 
occur, including licensure. Id. at 163. 
 25 Id. at 164–65. 
 26 The Casey court acknowledged the uncertainty that followed Roe in its bold opening: 
“[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Con-
stitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages . . . that definition 
of liberty is still questioned.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 27 Id. at 844. 
 28 Id. at 881 (quotation marks omitted). 
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child support, and agencies providing adoption and abortion alterna-
tives.29 If requested, physicians had to provide these materials.30 Under 
its new undue burden standard, the Court upheld all of the Pennsylva-
nia provisions except for spousal notification.31 Specifically, the Court 
noted that “the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the 
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of child-
birth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus” did not create an 
undue burden.32 
While discarding Roe’s trimester framework, the Court claimed to 
affirm “Roe’s essential holding”33 through the undue burden standard. 
This test has three clearly elucidated parts: first, a woman has the right 
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without 
undue interference from the state;34 second, the state has power to re-
strict abortions after fetal viability (but must allow exceptions for preg-
nancies endangering the life of the mother); and third, the state has a 
legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health 
of women and the life of the fetus.35 This new structure tempered Roe 
considerably: states could now regulate the procurement of abortions at 
all stages of pregnancy, provided the regulations did not constitute an 
undue burden having “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe-
tus.”36 Additionally, in an expression of the extent of its recognition of a 
state’s interest in “the life of the unborn,”37 the Casey court allowed for 
“state measure[s] designed to persuade [women] to choose childbirth 
over abortion,”38 provided the measures “reasonably related to that 
goal.”39 
While the petitioners in Casey challenged the Pennsylvania statute 
primarily as a violation of Roe, they also brought a First Amendment 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id. at 898. 
 32 Id. at 882. 
 33 Id. at 846. 
 34 The Court grounded this right in the Due Process Clause, a departure from Roe’s penumbral 
privacy approach. See id. at 846. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 877. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 878. 
 39 Id. The measures must still conform to the undue burden standard and cannot create “a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Id. at 877. 
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challenge, claiming the informed consent provisions impermissibly con-
trolled physicians’ speech.40 After assessing the informed consent pro-
visions under the undue burden standard, the Court dismissed this al-
ternative claim in three sentences: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information 
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner man-
dated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment 
rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard [cita-
tion omitted], but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject 
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen 
v. Roe [citation omitted]. We see no constitutional infirmity in 
the requirement that the physician provide the information 
mandated by the State here.41 
 Thus, while overall the Court upheld the informed consent re-
quirements under the undue burden standard,42 its treatment of the 
First Amendment claim lacks clarity and does not expressly foreclose 
independent First Amendment challenges to informed consent provi-
sions. 
The undue burden standard remains good law. The Court used it 
in Gonzales v. Carhart,43 and more recently in Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt.44 While these watershed abortion cases demonstrate the 
Court’s continued commitment to the undue burden test, they did not 
deal with informed consent provisions or First Amendment claims in 
the abortion context. Confusion over Casey’s framing has created a cir-
cuit split regarding the permissibility of First Amendment challenges 
to abortion informed consent measures, with the Eighth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Circuits on one side, and the Fourth Circuit on the other. 
A recent Supreme Court case also deserves mention. In National 
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (“NIFLA”),45 crisis 
pregnancy centers challenged a California statute that (a) required li-
censed centers to post notices explaining the existence of publicly 
funded family-planning services, including abortion, and (b) required 
 
 40 See id. at 881. 
 41 Id. at 884. 
 42 “[T]he right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue 
interference by the State . . . The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that 
right.” Id. at 887. 
 43 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth” abortions under the undue 
burden standard). 
 44 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (striking down a Texas regulation on abortion clinics under the undue 
burden standard). 
 45 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
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unlicensed centers to post notices stating that they were not licensed.46 
The Court found the fact that the notice requirement for licensed cen-
ters was not directly tied to a medical procedure to be dispositive.47 Re-
moved from an informed consent context, the licensed requirements 
were viewed as pure content-based regulations of speech.48 Subject to 
at least intermediate scrutiny, the Court held the licensed notice re-
quirements unconstitutional.49 The Court also struck down the unli-
censed center requirements as “unjustified and unduly burdensome.”50 
Relevant here, in its opinion the NIFLA Court characterized the 
informed consent provisions in Casey as regulations of professional con-
duct only incidentally burdening speech, a category subject to a lower 
standard of review.51 This indicates a willingness of the current Su-
preme Court to consider informed consent provisions as regulations of 
conduct, not speech, thus weakening the case for robust First Amend-
ment review. Respectfully, I do not believe the NIFLA Court’s framing 
conclusively demystifies Casey, as it occurs in dicta52 and does not en-
gage with alternative explanations for Casey’s reasoning. Moreover, 
even assuming the NIFLA court correctly characterized Casey, this can 
be read as limited to Casey’s facts. At best, read in conjunction with 
Casey, NIFLA “create[s] the guiding principle that reasonable regula-
tions that facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure are ex-
cepted from heightened scrutiny”53—an uncontroversial proposition. 
Notwithstanding NIFLA, the scope of permissible First Amendment 
challenges to abortion informed consent measures remains an open 
question. 
 
 46 Id. at 2368. 
 47 Id. at 2373–74. 
 48 Id. at 2375. 
 49 Id. The state argued that the requirements should be considered professional speech and 
therefore receive a lower standard of review. The Court, although highly skeptical of the profes-
sional speech doctrine, determined it did not need to answer the professional speech question “be-
cause the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.” Id. 
 50 Id. at 2378. The State argued that, as commercial speech, the unlicensed requirements 
should be subject to the more deferential Zauderer standard. The Court again did not feel the need 
to answer whether Zauderer applied because it held that the unlicensed center notice require-
ments could not meet even its lower standard of review. 
 51 Id. at 2372–73. 
 52 The Court’s characterization of Casey provides only an example of a category of speech the 
Court notes as warranting lower protection. The Court supports this category with citations to 
many other cases as well. Id. at 2373. Defining Casey is therefore “not necessary” nor a “necessary 
antecedent” to the Court’s holding. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
 53 EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 449 (6th Cir. 2019) (Don-
ald, J., dissenting). 
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: SINGULARITY OF THE UNDUE BURDEN 
STANDARD? 
A. Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits Dismiss First Amendment Chal-
lenges to Informed Consent Laws 
The Eighth Circuit has twice upheld the supremacy of the undue 
burden test when considering First Amendment challenges to informed 
consent requirements. In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Da-
kota, South Dakota v. Rounds (Rounds I),54 the Eighth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, rejected a compelled-speech challenge to a South Dakota law 
requiring doctors to provide several statements to women seeking abor-
tions as part of obtaining informed consent. These included statements 
that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being,” which “the pregnant woman has an existing [constitu-
tionally protected] relationship with,” and “[t]hat by having an abor-
tion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights 
with regards to that relationship will be terminated.”55 
Overruling the district court, the Eighth Circuit found the man-
dated statements well within the state’s regulatory power. The court 
concluded: 
Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot com-
pel an individual simply to speak the State’s ideological mes-
sage, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to 
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a pa-
tient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information 
might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abor-
tion.56 
Therefore, in order to succeed on its compelled speech claim, 
Planned Parenthood had to show that the mandated disclosures were 
untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.57 The statute at issue defined “hu-
man being,” for the purposes of the informed consent provision, as “in-
cluding the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal 
ages from fertilization to full gestation,”58 and the court held the statu-
tory definition controlling.59 Given this, the court found the challenged 
 
 54 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 55 Id. at 726. 
 56 Id. at 734–35.  
 57 See id. at 735. 
 58 Id. at 727. 
 59 “South Dakota recognizes the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that ‘[w]here [a 
term] is defined by statute, the statutory definition is controlling.’” Id. at 735 (citing Bruggeman 
v. S.D. Chem. Dependency Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)). 
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disclosures truthful and relevant.60 In sum, the Eighth Circuit held Ca-
sey and Gonzales precluded First Amendment claims to informed con-
sent laws when the speech at issue is truthful, nonmisleading, and rel-
evant. 
Four years later, the Eighth Circuit, again sitting en banc and 
again reversing the district court, reaffirmed its reading of Casey and 
upheld another part of the South Dakota statute in Rounds II.61 As part 
of obtaining informed consent, the statute required physicians to pro-
vide a written “description of . . . statistically significant risk factors to 
which the pregnant woman would be subjected, includ-
ing . . . [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”62 The Eighth 
Circuit held that this statement did not imply a causal link between 
abortion and suicide but rather indicated relative risk, which it found 
sufficiently supported by the scientific record and therefore truthful.63 
The court further held that despite medical and scientific uncertainty, 
the record did not conclusively rule out abortion as “a causal factor in 
the observed correlation between abortion and suicide,”64 and therefore 
the required disclosure was not misleading or irrelevant.65 
The Fifth Circuit held similarly in Texas Medical Providers Per-
forming Abortion Services v. Lakey.66 In Lakey, physicians and abortion 
providers brought a section 1983 action against the state of Texas, chal-
lenging a recently enacted bill that significantly amended Texas’ in-
formed consent laws.67 The challenged amendments required physi-
cians performing abortions to “perform and display a sonogram of the 
fetus, make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus . . . [and] ex-
plain . . . the results of each procedure.”68 A woman had to certify her 
physician’s compliance with these measures and wait 24 hours before 
receiving an abortion.69 The statute permitted a woman to decline to 
view the images or hear the heartbeat, but she could only decline to 
 
 60 Id. at 735. The court did not explicitly discuss why this statement is not misleading, but did 
note that it would be “incumbent upon one preparing the disclosure form required by [the statute], 
and upon a physician answering a patient’s questions about it, to account for any applicable stat-
utory definitions.” Id. 
 61 Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 62 Id. at 894. 
 63 “[T]he studies submitted by the State are sufficiently reliable to support the truth of the 
proposition that the relative risk of suicide and suicide ideation is higher for women who abort 
their pregnancies compared to women who give birth or have not become pregnant.” Id. at 898–
99. 
 64 Id. at 904. 
 65 Id. at 905. 
 66 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 67 Id. at 572. 
 68 Id. at 573. 
 69 Id. 
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receive an explanation of the sonogram images under three conditions: 
1) if her pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, 2) if she was a minor, 
or 3) if the fetus had a documented irreversible medical condition or 
abnormality.70 The district court granted a preliminary injunction 
against the disclosure provisions as impermissible compelled speech.71 
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Casey precluded the plain-
tiffs’ First Amendment challenge. The Lakey court focused on Casey’s 
brief discussion of the First Amendment claim, finding its absence of 
inquiry into compelling interests or narrow tailoring to be the “antithe-
sis of strict scrutiny.”72 The Fifth Circuit then turned to Gonzales, not-
ing its reaffirmance of Casey in upholding states’ “significant role . . . in 
regulating the medical profession” and the government’s ability to “use 
its voice and regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the 
life within the woman.”73 The court found that these two cases clearly 
established that “informed consent laws that do not impose an undue 
burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they 
require truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures,” and “are 
part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice and do not 
fall under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First 
Amendment strict scrutiny.”74 The court supported this interpretation 
of the case law by citing the Eighth Circuit in Rounds I.75 
The Fifth Circuit then noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Casey and 
Rounds, the plaintiff-appellees in the case at hand had brought solely a 
First Amendment claim.76 The court found this impermissible: 
If the disclosures are truthful and non-misleading, and if they 
would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plu-
rality opinion, then Appellees would, by means of their First 
Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck 
between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey, 
however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed con-
sent context.77 
 
 70 Id. at 578 n.6. 
 71 Id. at 573. The provisions were also challenged as void for vagueness, outside of the scope 
of this Comment. 
 72 Id. at 575. 
 73 Id. at 575–76 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 74 Id. at 576. 
 75 “Fortifying this reading, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc construed Casey and Gonzales 
in the same way.” Id. at 576–77 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 
(8th Cir. 2008)). 
 76 Id. at 577. 
 77 Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit finally denied the contention raised by plaintiff-
appellees that the disclosure requirements at issue differed qualita-
tively from those in Casey.78 The appellees’ argument here focused on 
two distinctions. First, because the disclosures of the sonogram and fe-
tal heartbeat were “medically unnecessary,” they went “beyond the 
standard practice of medicine within the state’s regulatory powers.”79 
Second, requiring the physician to explain the results of the sonogram 
and fetal heart auscultation verbally “makes the physician the ‘mouth-
piece’ of the state.”80 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the first point under 
Casey and Gonzales.81 As to the second point, the court held that this 
“mode of delivery does not make a constitutionally significant difference 
from the ‘availability’ provision in Casey . . . [t]he mode of compelled 
expression is not by itself constitutionally relevant, although the con-
text is.”82 For all these reasons, the court found that the provisions did 
not violate the First Amendment because they were “sustainable under 
Casey . . . [and] within the State’s power to regulate the practice of med-
icine.”83 The Fifth Circuit denied petitioners appeal for en banc re-
view.84 
The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the issue and aligned in de-
cision with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits. In EMW Women’s Surgical 
Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar,85 the court overruled the district court and up-
held the constitutionality of a Kentucky informed consent statute 
(H.B.2) against a First Amendment challenge.86 Echoing the Texas law 
at issue in Lakey, H.B.2 required that before giving an abortion a phy-
sician perform an ultrasound, display and explain the images, and aus-
cultate the fetal heartbeat.87 Although any patient could request that 
 
 78 Id. at 578. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 579. 
 81 “Appellees’ argument ignores that Casey and Gonzales . . . emphasize that the gravity of the 
decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual, medical detail, that the condition 
of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclo-
sures.” Id. 
 82 Id. at 579–80. 
 83 Id. at 580. 
 84 Press Release, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Denies 
Request to Rehear Texas Ultrasound Case (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.reproductiverights.org/pres 
s-room/fifth-circuit-court-of-appeals-denies-request-to-rehear-texas-ultrasound-case [https://perm 
a.cc/2X5L-7W5Y]. 
 85 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 86 Id. at 446. 
 87 Id. at 424. 
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the physician turn down the volume of the auscultation, the law pro-
vided no exemptions from these disclosures except in the case of a med-
ical emergency or a medically necessary abortion.88 
Relying heavily on its reading of Casey and NIFLA, the Beshar 
court determined that “First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not 
apply to incidental regulation of professional speech89 that is part of the 
practice of medicine and . . . such incidental regulation includes man-
dated informed-consent requirements, provided that the disclosures are 
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.”90 Characterizing the sonogram 
provisions as “‘materially identical’”91 to Casey’s requirements and 
highly relevant,92 the court found no constitutional infirmity in H.B.2. 
The court discussed Lakey and Rounds I at length, noting their “support 
[for] our holding today.”93 
B. Fourth Circuit Upholds First Amendment Challenge to Informed 
Consent Law 
Two years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey, but before the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Beshar, the Fourth Circuit addressed a com-
pelled speech challenge to a strikingly similar statute. In Stuart v. Cam-
nitz,94 physicians and abortion providers challenged the Display of 
Real-Time View Requirement of the North Carolina Woman’s Right to 
Know Act (“WRKA”).95 The requirement mandated ultrasounds for all 
women seeking abortions and required physicians to display the sono-
gram and “describe the fetus in detail, ‘includ[ing] the presence, loca-
tion, and dimensions of the unborn child within the uterus and the num-
ber of unborn children depicted,’ . . . as well as ‘the presence of external 
members and internal organs, if present and viewable.’”96 It also re-
quired physicians to provide women the option of hearing the fetal heart 
auscultation.97 The WRKA allowed exceptions to these measures only 
in the case of medical emergency; however, a woman could always 
“‘avert[ ] her eyes from the displayed images’ and ‘refus[e] to hear the 
 
 88 Id. at 424–25. 
 89 The Beshar court made NIFLA’s characterization of Casey central to its analysis and dis-
missed the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart (see part B) because it pre-dated NIFLA and there-
fore gave “insufficient regard” to NIFLA’s characterization of Casey. Id. at 435. 
 90 Id. at 429. 
 91 Id. at 431 (internal citations omitted). 
 92 Id. (“one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram images for twenty-first-century in-
formed consent.”). 
 93 Id. at 434. 
 94 774 F. 3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 95 Id. at 242–43. 
 96 Id. at 243. 
 97 Id. 
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simultaneous explanation and medical description’ by presumably cov-
ering her eyes and ears.”98 The district court, applying heightened, in-
termediate scrutiny, held that these requirements violated the physi-
cians’ First Amendment rights to free speech and entered a permanent 
injunction.99 
Unlike in Lakey or Rounds, here a unanimous Fourth Circuit af-
firmed.100 Analyzing the regulations first through a compelled speech 
lens, the Fourth Circuit held “[t]he Requirement [the regulations de-
scribed above] is quintessential compelled speech. It forces physicians 
to say things they otherwise would not say. . .[T]he statement com-
pelled here is ideological; it conveys a particular opinion.”101 Referenc-
ing Lakey, the court acknowledged that the mandated disclosures at is-
sue were factual but did not find this fact dispositive:  
[While] it is true that the words the state puts into the doctor’s 
mouth are factual, that does not divorce the speech from its 
moral or ideological implications. “[C]ontext matters.” . . . [The 
regulations] explicitly promote[] a pro-life message by demand-
ing the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion 
debate—and does so shortly before the time of decision when the 
intended recipient is most vulnerable.102 
The Fourth Circuit then assessed the requirements as standard 
medical regulation, acknowledging that states retain rights to regulate 
professional speech and mandate informed consent to medical proce-
dures.103 Despite this, the court held “individuals [do not] simply aban-
don their First Amendment rights when they commence practicing a 
profession,”104 and that “[w]ith all forms of compelled speech, [the court] 
must look to the context of the regulation to determine when the state’s 
regulatory authority has extended too far.”105 In the context of the 
WRKA, the court held that “the confluence of these factors points to-
ward borrowing a heightened intermediate scrutiny standard used in 
certain commercial speech cases.”106 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 244. 
 100 Id. at 256. 
 101 Id. at 246. Note that the state freely admitted “the purpose and anticipated effect of the 
Display of Real-Time View Requirement is to convince women seeking abortions to change their 
minds or reassess their decisions.” Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 247. 
 104 Id. The court supported this with reference to Casey (“[T]he physician’s First Amendment 
rights not to speak are implicated.”) Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 248. 
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The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated its reasons for diverging from 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits: 
With respect, our sister circuits read too much into Casey and 
Gonzales. The single paragraph in Casey does not assert that 
physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the proce-
dures surrounding abortions, nor does it announce the proper 
level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that compel 
speech to the extraordinary extent present here . . . the plurality 
simply stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the re-
quirement that the physician provide the information mandated 
by the State here.’ That particularized finding hardly announces 
a guiding standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent com-
pelled speech case involving abortion.107 
The court also held Gonzales, an undue burden case raising no First 
Amendment claim, inapplicable to the issue at hand. The court noted 
that Gonzales “says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should 
apply when reviewing a claim that a regulation compelling speech in 
the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment free speech 
rights.”108 The Fourth Circuit thus found its First Amendment analysis 
consistent with Casey and Gonzales. The State appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which denied certiorari.109 
III. CASEY DOES NOT FORECLOSE PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES TO INFORMED CONSENT LAWS 
A. Casey Does Not Displace First Amendment Protection for Physi-
cians 
The Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have curtailed First Amend-
ment protection for physicians in the context of abortion informed con-
sent measures. Each circuit held that when mandated informed consent 
disclosures are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the decision to 
have an abortion, they are permissible under Casey as long as they do 
not constitute an undue burden. Essentially, these circuits have disal-
lowed independent First Amendment analysis of physicians’ compelled 
speech claims by collapsing free speech analysis into the undue burden 
test. This reasoning misinterprets Casey. As Nadia Sawicki writes, “it 
is essential to recognize that the ‘truthful, not misleading, and relevant’ 
requirement is a condition on the constitutionality of disclosure laws 
 
 107 Id. at 249. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015). 
443] CASE FOR PROTECTING PHYSICIANS’ SPEECH 457 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘undue burden’ standard, rather 
than a condition of the First Amendment.”110 As recently articulated by 
Judge Donald in her powerful dissenting opinion in Beshar: 
The majority relies on undue burden jurisprudence to fashion a 
test that they believe comprehensively captures informed con-
sent. The result is erroneous . . . The three elements the major-
ity identifies—truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—were 
drawn from Casey, a controlling case that considered both an un-
due burden and a First Amendment challenge. These three ele-
ments, however, were central only to Casey’s undue burden anal-
ysis . . . Nowhere are these elements even mentioned in Casey’s 
discussion of the First Amendment. It is a mistake to transpose 
Casey’s holding on undue burden to the First Amendment chal-
lenge here.111 
In other words, Casey holds that truthful, nonmisleading, and rel-
evant informed consent disclosures do not per se violate a woman’s con-
stitutional right to choose. Casey does not, however, indicate that such 
disclosures can never be subject to First Amendment review. 
Common sense indicates that this must be the case. Imagine South 
Dakota revises its disclosure requirement with the only change being 
physicians are now required to stand up on a chair and yell at a woman 
that her abortion will end the life of a unique living human being. While 
this hypothetical obviously steps outside of the bounds of the regula-
tions considered in Casey, the Eighth Circuit does not offer a framework 
through which to challenge it. The disclosure has already been held 
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant, ending the First Amendment in-
quiry. While the yelling could be challenged as creating an undue bur-
den, the Eighth Circuit would struggle to qualitatively differentiate it 
from the written statement, especially given the permissibility of regu-
lations designed to dissuade women from choosing abortion.112 Even if 
the Eighth Circuit invalidated this law under the undue burden stand-
ard, the fact remains that it would be impossible, under Eighth Circuit 
 
 110 Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and 
Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 24–25 (2016). 
 111 EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, 
J., dissenting). 
 112 “Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to 
speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to 
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, 
even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.” 
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
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precedent, for a physician to challenge this law under the First Amend-
ment. This significantly reduces protection of physicians’ speech. 
It does not seem plausible that the Court would create this large 
exemption from First Amendment protection in such an ambiguous 
way. Justice Scalia famously wrote that “Congress . . . does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse-
holes.”113 The same reasoning should apply to Supreme Court holdings, 
particularly in the context of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has historically been hesitant to create exceptions to free speech protec-
tion. As the Court recently stated in NIFLA, “[t]his Court has ‘been re-
luctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished constitu-
tional protection,’”114 and “[we have] been especially reluctant to 
‘exemp[t] a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-
based restrictions.’”115 In this context, reading the three sentences in 
Casey as creating a new category of lessened speech protection—for 
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant informed consent disclosures—
seems all the more implausible.116 A simpler, more reasonable reading 
of Casey is that the Court, having already held the informed consent 
provisions permissible under the undue burden standard, and finding 
the regulations at issue within the usual confines of a state’s regulatory 
power, did not feel the need to explore the First Amendment issue fur-
ther.117 
B. Whalen Does Not Trump Wooley 
In its discussion of the First Amendment issues in Casey, the Court 
cited to Wooley v. Maynard118 and Whalen v. Roe,119 two seemingly con-
flicting cases. In Wooley, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a 
New Hampshire statute that required residents to display “Live Free 
 
 113 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 114 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing Denver 
Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996)). 
 115 Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012)). 
 116 I recognize the irony of using NIFLA to support this claim, given its characterization of 
Casey—but disputing that characterization does not rob other portions of the opinion of their per-
suasiveness. 
 117 The courts that have found otherwise have arguably fallen prey to a phenomenon recently 
articulated in a different context by Justice Gorsuch: “treating judicial opinions as if they were 
statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context, ignoring all that came before and after, 
and treating an isolated phrase as if it were controlling.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 
2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 118 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 119 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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or Die” on their license plates.120 In Whalen, the Court upheld, as an 
appropriate use of state police power, a New York statute requiring phy-
sicians to disclose to the government prescription records of certain 
drugs.121 As Robert Post writes, “[e]xactly how the strict First Amend-
ment standards of Wooley are meant to qualify the broad police power 
discretion of Whalen is left entirely obscure.”122 However, a close look at 
each case shows that Whalen should not qualify Wooley to the extent of 
foreclosing a physician’s ability to bring First Amendment challenges 
to informed consent laws. 
The Supreme Court struck down the license plate statute in 
Wooley, recognizing that “the right of freedom of thought protected by 
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”123 In Lakey, 
the Fifth Circuit took up Wooley as a defense against the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that requiring physicians to voice the mandated information 
was constitutionally significant. The Lakey court cited Wooley as sup-
port for the statement that “[t]he mode of compelled expression is not 
by itself constitutionally relevant, although the context is.”124 However, 
Wooley suggests more than that. Comparing the case to West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette,125 the seminal case in which the 
Supreme Court acknowledged a First Amendment right to be free from 
compelled speech in the context of the school flag salute, the Wooley 
Court stated that “[c]ompelling the affirmative act of a flag salute in-
volved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the 
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the differ-
ence is essentially one of degree.”126 This statement supports two suppo-
sitions: first, compelled speech is an infringement, and second, the ex-
tent to which it is compelled can affect the analysis. Therefore, the 
Lakey court’s exclusive focus on context is incomplete. Wooley indicates 
that the mode of compelled expression is also relevant insofar as it can 
heighten the severity of the infringement. A provision demanding that 
doctors voice the state’s information in their own words requires signif-
icantly more affirmative action than merely providing pamphlets. Thus, 
 
 120 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (“We must also determine whether the State’s countervailing inter-
est is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their li-
cense plates.”). 
 121 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598. 
 122 Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Phy-
sician Speech, U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946 (2007). 
 123 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. 
 124 Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 125 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 126 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added). 
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the provisions at issue in Lakey analogize more closely to Barnette than 
to Wooley, and Wooley suggests that this increases the gravity of the 
infringement. 
Immediately following its reference to Wooley, the Casey court 
acknowledges that the medical context tempers its First Amendment 
analysis, citing to Whalen. In Whalen, the Court upheld, against a pri-
vacy challenge, a New York statute requiring that the state receive a 
copy of every prescription for a certain class of drugs categorized as 
highly dangerous.127 In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit described Whalen in one 
sentence as a case “in which the Court had upheld a regulation of med-
ical practice against a right to privacy challenge.”128 Again, their synop-
sis is imprecise. In analyzing the constitutional validity of the provision, 
the Whalen court considered its effect on the independence of physicians 
and patients: 
Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of the 
right to decide independently, with the advice of his physician, 
to acquire and to use needed medication . . . the decision to pre-
scribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient. 
We hold that . . . [the] impact of the patient-identification re-
quirements in the [statute] on either the reputation or the inde-
pendence of the patients is [not] sufficient to constitute an inva-
sion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (emphasis added).129 
While the Court did uphold the medical regulation, it clearly 
weighed, as highly significant, the regulation’s effect on the independ-
ence of patients’ and physicians’ decision making. With regards to the 
independence of patients, Casey and Gonzales admittedly allow for 
states to voice their disapproval of abortion even if it results in altering 
a woman’s choice to have one. Application of the undue burden standard 
thus encompasses any infringement on patients’ decision making in its 
calculation. However, while the undue burden standard speaks to the 
relevance of women’s independence in receiving abortions, it does not 
speak to that of the physicians offering them. 
The Casey Court’s citation to Whalen indicates that infringements 
on the independence of doctors should be factored into the permissibil-
ity of medical regulations. Excluding First Amendment challenges to 
informed consent measures, however, removes the only avenue through 
which such infringements can be considered. Although in Casey, like in 
 
 127 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04. 
 128 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575. 
 129 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added). 
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Whalen, the extent of infringement on the independence of the physi-
cian-patient relationship fell within permissible grounds, that determi-
nation was limited to the facts of Casey.130 The provisions in Rounds, 
Lakey, Beshar, and Stuart, which prescribed descriptive and invasive 
procedures doctors must follow, intrude on the physician-patient rela-
tionship significantly more. 
In sum, allowing physicians to bring First Amendment challenges 
to informed consent provisions does not “trump the balance Casey 
struck between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives.”131 Casey 
weighed women’s rights and states’ rights in crafting the undue burden 
standard, but it did no such careful weighing in regard to physicians’ 
First Amendment rights. Thus, when the burden on physicians’ speech 
goes significantly beyond the regulations upheld in Casey, Casey no 
longer applies. 
IV. ADOPTING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Competing Interests Clash in the Context of Informed Consent 
Laws 
Assuming that Casey does not foreclose physicians from bringing 
First Amendment challenges to informed consent laws, there remains 
an open question: what standard should courts use to review these chal-
lenges? With First Amendment claims, context drives this inquiry.132 
As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Stuart, informed consent laws lie at 
a unique intersection between impermissible content-based compelled 
speech and permissible state regulations of mandated informed consent 
to a medical procedure.133 The Supreme Court has not conclusively 
weighed in on this muddled area of First Amendment law; conse-
quently, Casey, with all its resulting confusion, offers the Court’s clear-
est declaration on the issue. 
Content-based restrictions on speech are generally assessed under 
strict scrutiny.134 For a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must further a 
compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to effectuate 
 
 130 “We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the infor-
mation mandated by the State here.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
 131 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577. 
 132 “Laws that impinge upon speech receive different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on 
the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 
F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
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that interest.135 Many commenters consider this rigorous standard es-
sentially fatal, as the Supreme Court has upheld only two speech re-
striction laws under it.136 Freedom from compelled speech, or the right 
not to speak, has long been recognized as protected under the First 
Amendment. Compelled speech is necessarily content-based and thus 
also assessed under strict scrutiny.137 Viewed purely through this lens, 
informed consent laws that compel physician speech, like those in 
Rounds, Lakey, Beshar, and Stuart, would be reviewed under strict 
scrutiny and would almost certainly be stricken down. 
However, compelled speech of medical professionals runs up 
against another line of precedent. States have police powers through 
which they can regulate medicine and other professions.138 Courts gen-
erally review regulations of this sort under rational basis review, which 
merely requires a statute be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest.139 While not quite a rubber stamp, most laws pass this 
deferential standard. Additionally, the necessity of informed consent to 
medical procedures is well established under tort law.140 Similarly, phy-
sicians are routinely held liable for malpractice, even when the harm 
results from a physician’s speech or lack thereof (e.g. failure to inform 
a patient of a procedure’s risks or giving incorrect medical advice).141 
In Casey, the Court acknowledged both these lines of precedent: 
“the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, 
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licens-
ing and regulation by the State.”142 Beyond this statement and the ci-
tations to Wooley and Maynard discussed in Part III, the Casey Court 
did not offer a precise standard through which to assess infringements 
on physicians’ First Amendment rights. 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Oc-
cupational Speech, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 205 (2018). 
 137 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (U.S. 1988) (“Mandating speech 
that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”). 
 138 Police powers come from the Tenth Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend X. See also Sawicki, supra note 112 at 12 (“States are 
authorized to regulate medicine and other professions by virtue of their police power, the unenu-
merated power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of a state’s citizenry”). See also Dent v. 
W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
 139 Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV 1627, 1629 
(2016). 
 140 See generally W.M. Moldoff, Malpractice: Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and 
Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (originally published 1961). 
 141 “Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors are routinely held liable for 
malpractice for speaking or for failing to speak.” Post, supra note 122, at 950. 
 142 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). 
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B. Eliminating the Extremes (Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis Re-
view) 
While the appropriate standard could thus fall anywhere from 
strict scrutiny to rational basis review, the endpoints of the range can 
be eliminated from consideration. A standard of strict scrutiny seems 
hard to reconcile with Casey.143 As the Lakey court rightfully notes, the 
Casey Court’s three-sentence First Amendment discussion “is clearly 
not a strict scrutiny analysis . . . [because] [i]t inquires into neither 
compelling interests nor narrow tailoring.”144 Moreover, applying strict 
scrutiny to abortion informed consent laws would run afoul of the 
Court’s historic recognition of state laws regulating the medical profes-
sion, a point noted by the Casey court itself.145 Sound policy reasons 
buoy this recognition. Patients depend on physicians to inform them of 
their treatment options, but they usually lack the necessary medical 
background or understanding to validate the information inde-
pendently. Thus, by necessity, patients place blind trust in the advice 
they receive from their doctors. This trust is made less blind, however, 
by two systems working in tandem: indirect regulation through medical 
malpractice liability, and direct regulation by the state. Reviewing 
these regulations under strict scrutiny would inappropriately encumber 
this system, even in the limited context of abortion informed consent 
measures. 
Rational basis review, at first blush, appears better supported by 
the language used by the Casey court in its discussion of the First 
Amendment claim. The Court’s use of the word “reasonable” can be read 
as synonymous with rational,146 and its cursory First Amendment anal-
ysis could indicate deference to the state’s regulatory power. However, 
as Carl Coleman explains, “the plurality made this statement only after 
having already determined (in the context of its due process analysis) 
that the state had a ‘substantial’ interest in requiring the disclosures 
and noting ‘the ways in which the speech requirement was narrowly 
 
 143 This statement should not be taken as an endorsement of Casey’s holding. However, this 
Comment seeks to offer a standard that coheres with precedent and could be used with the current 
state of the law. Consistency with Casey is a necessary element of such a standard. 
 144 Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 
2012). See also Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, N.C. L. REV. 9 (forthcoming), avail-
able at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3234300 (“The most that can be said about Casey is that the plu-
rality was clearly not applying strict scrutiny in its First Amendment analysis, as it made no effort 
to determine whether the statute was ‘narrowly tailored’ or based on a ‘compelling state interest.’”). 
 145 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
 146 “On the one hand, [the Casey plurality’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such 
laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often 
used as a synonym for ‘rational.’” Coleman, supra note 144, at 9. 
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drawn.’”147 Given this context, the word “reasonable” alone should not 
determine the standard of review. Moreover, application of rational ba-
sis review would render the discussion in Part III largely academic, be-
cause all of the informed consent measures mentioned so far would 
likely survive. This would essentially allow the carve-out of First 
Amendment protection for informed consent measures functionally 
claimed by the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Thus, for the reasons 
discussed in Part III, rational basis review cannot be the appropriate 
standard. 
In sum, both extremes—strict scrutiny and rational basis review—
fail as potential standards of review. Strict scrutiny is incompatible 
with the language in Casey and fails to acknowledge the state’s legiti-
mate regulatory role in the realm of medical disclosures. Rational basis 
review ignores the context of Casey and would, in effect, impermissibly 
excuse abortion informed consent measures from meaningful review. 
C. Searching the Middle for a Standard 
Rejecting both strict scrutiny and rational basis review eliminates 
the clearest available standards, forcing an examination of the mushy 
middle ground of First Amendment protection. As will be discussed in 
sub-section D, intermediate scrutiny emerges from this search as the 
best standard. Reaching that conclusion requires analysis of why other 
possible intermediate standards fail in the context of informed consent 
to abortion.148 In this section, two other potential standards that have 
been offered as options will be examined: “truthful, nonmisleading, and 
relevant” (hereinafter “TNR”), and “factual and noncontroversial” (the 
Zauderer standard). Both fail to strike the right balance of protection. 
As discussed in section II(a), the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits 
used a “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant” standard to assess the 
challenged informed consent measures. In so doing, these circuits inap-
propriately folded First Amendment analysis into the undue burden 
test (see section III). This does not, however, mean that a TNR standard 
should be disregarded per se. While the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 For the purposes of this Comment I have set aside the concept of professional speech as a 
framework through which to consider abortion informed consent requirements. Professional 
speech has received varied and inconsistent treatment in the circuit courts. See Erika Schutzman, 
We Need Professional Help: Advocating For a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of 
Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 2019, 2023 (“Courts have pro-
vided little clarity as to the extent to which the First Amendment rights of professionals should be 
protected or balanced against the interests of the state . . . several circuits have tackled the issue 
of professional speech, with varying results.”). Moreover, the Court’s opinion in NIFLA casts doubt 
on the validity of the professional speech doctrine. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (“this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a 
separate category of speech.”). 
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erred in failing to acknowledge the necessity of an independent First 
Amendment analysis, had they done so, TNR could have been an appro-
priate standard. Such an approach would uphold informed consent 
measures that mandate truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclo-
sures. 
A TNR test has the benefit of seemingly easy compatibility with 
Casey. The Casey court held the truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant 
disclosures at issue in the Pennsylvania law admissible under the un-
due burden test. It then went on to find no First Amendment issue with 
the mandated disclosures. It follows that, at a minimum, truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant disclosures similar in kind to those seen in 
Casey pass First Amendment scrutiny.149 
Applied beyond Casey, however, TNR offers a slippery standard. 
The circuit split discussed in Part II illustrates this: in some jurisdic-
tions, information relevant to having an abortion includes an often un-
necessary and costly medical procedure, while in others it does not. La-
boratories of democracy notwithstanding, a standard does not offer good 
guidance if speech relating to a medical procedure can be so differently 
conscripted depending on the state in which it occurs. Pulling a unique 
First Amendment standard from Casey stretches the Court’s acknowl-
edgment of abortion exceptionalism beyond recognition.150 
Another midway standard comes from the context of commercial 
speech. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court 
of Ohio,151 the Court upheld an Ohio Disciplinary Rule that required 
attorneys advertising contingent-fee based representation to disclose 
that clients may have to pay certain costs if they lose.152 The Court in 
 
 149 However, a reasonableness assessment also seems baked into the Casey Court’s discussion 
of the informed consent measures. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“In short, requiring that the woman 
be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance 
available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure 
an informed choice”) (emphasis added); id. at 885 (“Thus, we uphold the provision [requiring a 
physician as opposed to a qualified assistant to provide information regarding informed consent] 
as a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed”) (emphasis added). There-
fore, truthful, nonmisleading, and reasonable (as opposed to or in addition to relevant) could be a 
more appropriate test to draw from Casey. Given that none of the circuits discussed in this Com-
ment offered it as a standard, I am not giving this test full analysis. Moreover, I am not proffering 
it as an alternative standard because the flexibility of a reasonableness assessment would not 
adequately safeguard against free speech abuses in the abortion context. 
 150 Id. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act . . . the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense 
unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.”). See also Linda Greenhouse, Why Courts 
Shouldn’t Ignore the Facts About Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/why-courts-shouldnt-ignore-the-facts-about-abortion-rights 
.html (“‘abortion exceptionalism’” is the argument “that abortion has a moral valence that makes 
it different from the many other medical procedures that states subject to less rigorous oversight. 
The Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence recognizes this”). 
 151 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 152 Id. at 652. 
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Zauderer indicated that disclosure requirements mandating only 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which . . . services will be available”153 would be upheld if they “reason-
ably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers,”154 and were not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”155 From this 
language the Zauderer standard emerged, namely “more deferential re-
view to some laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncon-
troversial information in their ‘commercial speech.’”156 Elements of the 
reach and scope of Zauderer remain unclear.157 
Some commentators have suggested that courts could use the Zau-
derer standard to assess regulations relating to abortion, including in-
formed consent measures.158 Such an approach would uphold the con-
stitutionality of factual and uncontroversial informed consent 
disclosures. Prior to NIFLA, this approach arguably had legs. In the 
wake of NIFLA, however, the use of Zauderer in the abortion context 
cannot stand. In considering the appropriate standard of review for the 
California notice requirement for licensed clinics, the Court stated: “The 
Zauderer standard does not apply here . . . The notice in no way relates 
to the services that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these 
clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services—includ-
ing abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zau-
derer has no application here.”159 Arguably, informed consent measures 
differ qualitatively from the notice provisions in NIFLA because they 
relate more directly to the service being offered (abortion). However, 
NIFLA clearly colors abortion as a controversial topic, sharply circum-
scribing Zauderer’s application. Moreover, even without considering 
NIFLA, Zauderer review would likely strike down many of the informed 
consent measures upheld in Casey (while describing the nature of the 
procedure and associated health risks might pass, requiring notice of 
 
 153 Id. at 651. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). 
 157 Open questions include whether state interests aside from preventing consumer deception 
can sustain disclosure requirements, and what qualifies as “controversial.” For one circuit’s take, 
see Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that government 
interests in addition to correcting deception can be invoked to sustain disclosure mandates under 
Zauderer); Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding as 
controversial an S.E.C. requirement that a company that could not determine the origin of its 
minerals must list its products as not Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict free). 
 158 See Coleman, supra note 144, at 22 (noting the similarity between the Rounds I court’s focus 
on whether the compelled disclosures were “truthful and not misleading” and the Zauderer stand-
ard). Interestingly, this was the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in Casey. See Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
 159 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
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the probable gestational age of the child as well as state-sponsored ma-
terials regarding alternatives seems controversial). Given both this and 
the framing of abortion in NIFLA, it follows that abortion informed con-
sent disclosures do not qualify for Zauderer review. 
D. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard 
Intermediate scrutiny (sometimes also referred to as heightened 
scrutiny) straddles the line between rational basis review and strict 
scrutiny. It developed as a response to gender discrimination claims un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment160 and more recently has emerged as 
the standard for assessing regulations of some commercial speech.161 
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the state demonstrate “at least that 
the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest and 
that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest,”162 with a “fit be-
tween the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those 
ends.”163 Courts sometimes define the appropriate fit as one that is not 
“more extensive than necessary.”164 Under intermediate scrutiny, “[t]he 
court can and should take into account the effect of the regulation on 
the intended recipient of the compelled speech, especially where she is 
a captive listener.”165 
Intermediate scrutiny appropriately balances the tensions created 
by informed consent measures. On the one hand, the regulation of pri-
vate medical decisions falls within the ambit of the state. On the other 
hand, abortion is a matter of public concern, and many informed con-
sent measures are designed precisely to express the state’s disapproval 
of the practice in general. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that 
“[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the 
First Amendment’s protection’. . . In contrast, speech on matters of 
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”166 Govern-
mental regulations of speech on matters of public concern traditionally 
trigger a higher level of scrutiny.167 Abortion qualifies as an issue in 
both realms: private as applied to a woman’s particular circumstances, 
 
 160 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
 161 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 162 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011). 
 163 Id. at 572 (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 164 Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 2014) (defining inter-
mediate scrutiny as looking to whether a law is “no more extensive than necessary to serve a 
substantial governmental interest”). 
 165 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 166 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985). 
 167 Id. at 759. 
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which are wholly her own, yet a controversial part of the public forum. 
In choosing the dialogue between a woman and her physician as a time 
during which to express disapproval of abortion, states have introduced 
the public forum into a “deeply personal decision[].”168 
This raises concerns of government overreach, flagged by Justice 
Thomas in NIFLA. Justice Thomas observed that the Supreme Court 
“has stressed the danger of content-based regulations ‘in the fields of 
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.’”169 Not-
ing that “‘[d]octors help patients make deeply personal decisions, and 
their candor is crucial,’”170 Justice Thomas warned that “[t]hroughout 
history, governments have ‘manipulat[ed] the content of doctor-patient 
discourse to increase state power and suppress minorities.”171 Context 
can either increase or mitigate this concern. State regulations designed 
to empower personal and private decisions by requiring physicians to 
provide largely uncontroversial information lessen this concern. For ex-
ample, a law requiring disclosure of specific risks about electroconvul-
sive treatment mostly affects a private treatment decision and does not 
implicate a greater public issue. Content-based regulations that touch 
on issues of public concern, however, increase the fear of government 
manipulation, and therefore require more protection under the First 
Amendment. Using intermediate scrutiny for abortion informed con-
sent measures recognizes the state’s regulatory power while ensuring 
that regulations impacting speech on an issue of public concern receive 
adequate First Amendment protection.172 
Moreover, informed consent measures implicate two constitutional 
guarantees: a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, and her phy-
sician’s right to be free from compelled speech. As noted, the law han-
dles each separately, under the undue burden test and the First Amend-
ment, respectively. However, a better approach would recognize that 
each infringement does not occur in a vacuum. In compelling physi-
cians’ speech and conduct, informed consent measures necessarily 
touch on a woman’s right to an abortion as well. The law should recog-
nize this dual infringement by adopting a higher standard of review in 
 
 168 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Woll-
schaleger v. Governor of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1328 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)) (quotations omit-
ted). 
 169 Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)). 
 170 Id. (citing Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1328). 
 171 Id. (citing Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to 
Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.L. REV. 201, 201–202 (1994)). 
 172 While this Comment has focused narrowly on abortion informed consent measures, this 
approach could supply a model for other regulations of physicians’ speech that touch issues of 
public concern, e.g. informed-consent to vaccinations. 
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assessing the relevant free speech claim—namely, intermediate scru-
tiny.173 Notably, the Supreme Court has adopted such a hybrid rights 
approach in regard to one category of free speech claims.174 
Analogous reasoning should apply in the case of abortion informed 
consent measures. This is not to advocate for a generally more liberal 
adoption of the hybrid rights approach. However, such an approach 
would be particularly appropriate in the limited context of abortion in-
formed consent measures, where the relevant harm to women is deem-
phasized when informed consent measures are challenged under the 
First Amendment (see part E). A hybrid rights approach would also 
help insulate informed consent measures from being challenged as reg-
ulations of conduct that only incidentally burden speech, thereby ensur-
ing a higher standard of review. 
Advocating for intermediate scrutiny as the correct standard for 
assessing abortion informed consent requirements necessitates ad-
dressing its consistency with Casey. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart of-
fered intermediate scrutiny as consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent but did not explain its rationale.175 Examined closely, consistency 
with Casey is the main weakness of intermediate scrutiny. The problem 
does not stem from the text;176 rather, one can legitimately argue that 
the informed consent provisions upheld in Casey would flunk interme-
diate scrutiny. A state’s substantial interest in the potentiality of life is 
clearly supported by Casey and Gonzales. This leaves only an inquiry 
into the fit between this end and the means used in Casey. It is not clear 
that requiring physicians to tell a woman the probable gestational age 
of the fetus, and give her information regarding abortion alternatives, 
are measures reasonably drawn to achieve that interest. Perhaps an 
 
 173 Under this reasoning, the reverse, a higher standard of review for assessing the infringe-
ment on the constitutional right to an abortion when physicians’ First Amendment rights are im-
plicated, would also be true. This argument proves more difficult, given that in the case of abortion 
rights the Court has codified the standard of review into the constitutional test itself. One would 
have to argue that the threshold of what constitutes an undue burden rises when physicians’ First 
Amendment rights are involved. While not untenable, there is more room to make the argument 
for a hybrid rights approach on the flip side, where the standard of review has not been set. 
 174 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (defin-
ing hybrid rights as a Free Exercise Clause claims in conjunction with another constitutional vio-
lation). 
 175 “[Casey] says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should apply when reviewing a claim 
that a regulation compelling speech in the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment 
free speech rights . . . A heightened intermediate level of scrutiny is thus consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection here.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 
238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 176 As discussed in part B supra, while the word “reasonable” could be read to mean “rational,” 
the Court makes this statement only after having already concluded the existence of a substantial 
state interest and noting the tailoring of the regulation. Thus, the Court’s language in Casey does 
not preclude intermediate scrutiny. 
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appropriate fit would only require that physicians offer to tell the ges-
tational age, and that the state raise awareness about abortion alterna-
tives through a general advertising campaign rather than through doc-
tors. One can thus argue that the Casey provisions overstep a state’s 
interest and therefore would fail intermediate scrutiny review. 
However, one can also plausibly argue that the Casey requirements 
would withstand intermediate scrutiny review. In light of the weight 
the Supreme Court has given to this particular state interest, the dis-
closure requirements in Casey seem minimally invasive and appropri-
ately tailored. To put it simply, this is a close call. However, given the 
other reasons weighing in favor of intermediate scrutiny, a slightly pre-
carious relationship with Casey should not ultimately be disqualifying. 
Rather, courts should use Casey as a helpful guide for framing their fit 
inquiry. Regulations similar in kind to those in Casey, such as giving 
the age of the fetus or offering printed materials describing alternative 
options and support, can be seen as representative of the appropriate 
balance between a state’s interest in potential life and the means it can 
use to further it. 
E. #MeToo Movement Supports Use of Intermediate Scrutiny 
The context of #MeToo also supports the use of intermediate scru-
tiny for assessing informed consent regulations. When Casey replaced 
Roe’s trimester system, it fundamentally altered the reproductive 
rights of women. Casey’s undue burden standard has allowed states to 
encumber pre-viability abortions through a wide range of regulations. 
The laxity of the undue burden standard as a tool through which to at-
tack these increasingly severe state regulations has created a special 
need for First Amendment claims in this context. 
 First Amendment claims to informed consent measures, however, 
necessarily shift the focus from women to their doctors. The relevant 
constitutional harm is no longer the burden on the woman, but rather 
the infringement on her doctor. Particularly in the context of #MeToo, 
this should give us pause. The #MeToo movement has shone a bright 
and harsh light on the prevalence of sexual violence and harassment 
against women. While sexual harassment is a critical issue, #MeToo 
also goes beyond this. At its core, it speaks to our culture’s historic and 
deeply-rooted disregard of women’s agency in all aspects of life, from 
the bedroom, to the boardroom, to the street. The Court in Casey 
acknowledged that the right to an abortion is justified in part by “the 
right to physical autonomy.”177 We should consider the laws discussed 
earlier in this light. Giving a woman false information that abortion 
 
 177 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
443] CASE FOR PROTECTING PHYSICIANS’ SPEECH 471 
increases her suicide risk tells her that the state knows her better than 
she knows herself. Forcing her to endure an invasive medical procedure 
solely to show her images of the pregnancy she came to the doctor to 
terminate implies that she does not fully know what she is doing. 
This harm is lost, though, when framing the legal issue under the 
First Amendment. This is not to question the exigency of free speech 
concerns. However, the informed consent laws considered in this Com-
ment were designed, above all, to impact women seeking abortions, not 
their doctors. By focusing on physicians, we surrender the interests of 
women to those of others.178 This denies women agency in yet another 
arena where it has been historically neglected: the courtroom. Particu-
larly in the era of #MeToo, we shouldn’t lose sight of this quiet injustice. 
The undue burden test does not adequately protect women’s agency 
and autonomy when seeking an abortion. Free speech challenges to 
abortion informed consent measures offer a second-best tool with which 
to attack invasive regulations. Assessing these regulations through in-
termediate scrutiny allows courts to consider how a state has tailored a 
regulation and its effect on the listener. In this inquiry, there is room to 
consider a regulation’s impact on women. Therefore, adopting interme-
diate scrutiny as the standard of review for informed consent measures 
does some work toward remedying the harm done by the First Amend-
ment framing of this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In crafting the undue burden standard in Casey, the Supreme 
Court carefully weighed the rights of women and the rights of the state. 
The rights of physicians, however, received no such measured consider-
ation. Reading Casey as exempting abortion informed consent provi-
sions from First Amendment challenge bends reason to the breaking 
point. Casey does not foreclose these challenges, nor does it offer a pre-
cise standard with which to review them. Intermediate scrutiny is the 
only standard that appropriately handles the conflicting interests at the 




 178 Admittedly, many physicians are female. However, this does not negate the harm in a shift 
from an entirely female category—women seeking abortions—to a category that, while inclusive 
of women, also includes men. Moreover, the necessity of obtaining an abortion for the women seek-
ing them makes them a particularly vulnerable group of women, a fact that does not extend to 
female physicians. 
